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ance programs to ensure they do not run afoul 
of the stringent U.S. procurement requirements. 
 In the past decade, however, as U.S. Govern-
ment contractors continue to expand their global 
presence, even the most experienced contractors 
have exposed themselves to new risks and compli-
ance requirements. In particular, as contractors 
expand their business with government entities 
outside the United States, the long arm of the U.S. 
Government continues to govern their transac-
tions. Specifically, the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act prohibits, among other things, the bribery 
The U.S. Government spent nearly $538 billion dollars in Fiscal Year 2010 for goods and services provided by private contractors.1 This astronomical number is the result of the U.S. Government’s 
ever-increasing reliance on private companies to keep the Government running. Private companies 
that contract with the U.S. Government are subject to an extensive set of rules and requirements 
designed to ensure they behave responsibly and to provide taxpayers and the U.S. Government with 
the best value for their money.2 Experienced Government contractors maintain sophisticated compli-
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of foreign officials to obtain or retain business 
with a foreign entity.3 
 The United States is currently the world leader 
in foreign antibribery enforcement.4 This is due 
to a sharp rise in FCPA enforcement activity in 
the past decade.5 The number of FCPA enforce-
ment actions continues to increase each year, 
breaking records not only in the number of cor-
porate prosecutions, but also in total penalties 
imposed. In 2010 alone, total penalties resulting 
from FCPA enforcement actions topped $1.7 
billion.6 In addition, with over 150 criminal and 
80 civil FCPA investigations in the pipeline in 
2010, enforcement does not show signs of slow-
ing anytime soon.7 Indeed, the Department of 
Justice has made clear that FCPA enforcement is 
a priority, noting that it “remains committed to 
prosecuting violations of the FCPA to ensure that 
the payment of bribes can no longer be viewed 
simply as the cost of doing business in a foreign 
nation.”8
 While FCPA compliance is imperative for all 
companies subject to its jurisdiction, it is particu-
larly important for companies that contract with 
the Government. Given the nature of a Govern-
ment contractor’s business, they are naturally 
at greater risk of violating the FCPA than those 
companies that do not interact with Government 
officials on a regular basis. In fact, in the years 
preceding the enactment of the FCPA, the U.S. 
Congress singled out Government contractors and 
their overseas behavior as particularly troubling. 
In the 1970s, a bribery scandal involving Lockheed 
Corporation (now Lockheed Martin Corporation), 
Northrop Corporation, and oil companies (Gulf 
Oil Corporation, Phillips Petroleum Company, 
and Ashland Oil, Inc.) was the likely impetus for 
legislation prohibiting overseas corruption.9 The 
Government discovered, among other instances 
of bribery, that Lockheed had paid millions of 
dollars in bribes to foreign governments to secure 
contracts, embarrassing both the United States 
and the relevant foreign governments.10 Moreover, 
although the company admitted to paying $22 
million “under the table to foreign government 
officials and political organizations,” the company 
refused to identify the recipients of the bribes, 
explaining that “identifying its beneficiaries could 
hurt its $1.6 billion backlog of unfilled foreign 
orders.”11 The company also refused to promise 
to stop bribing foreign officials, stating that the 
payments were a necessary cost of doing business 
and “consistent with practices engaged in by 
numerous other companies abroad.”12 Govern-
ment investigations and congressional hearings 
during this time uncovered a landscape in which 
bribery was pervasive and an accepted practice 
of the Government’s largest contractors.13 Thus, 
in enacting the FCPA, the Government sought 
to deter and prevent Government contractors 
and other companies from engaging in corrupt 
practices overseas. 
 Three decades later, the legislation designed 
to prevent and punish the bribery of foreign 
government officials has become a thorn in the 
side of companies that seek to do business with 
the U.S. Government. Six of the 10 most prolific 
contractors with the U.S. Government, includ-
ing Lockheed Martin Corporation, The Boeing 
Company, General Dynamics Corporation, Ray-
theon Company, L-3 Communications, and BAE 
Systems, either violated the FCPA or engaged 
in activities that allegedly implicate the FCPA’s 
antibribery provisions. Moreover, U.S. Govern-
ment contractors that have been investigated by 
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the Government for violating the FCPA generally 
have not settled cheaply. In fact, the top 10 most 
expensive settlements in FCPA history include 
eight large U.S. Government contractors: Siemens 
AG, Halliburton/KBR, BAE Systems, JGC Corpo-
ration, Daimler AG, Alcatel-Lucent, Panalpina, 
and Johnson & Johnson.14  
 For contractors that do business with the Fed-
eral Government, these record-shattering FCPA 
fines are levied in the shadow of the U.S. Gov-
ernment’s purchasing power. For example, the 
companies that settled the three most expensive 
FCPA enforcement actions to date, and together 
paid approximately $1.8 billion in fines (Siemens 
AG, $800 million; Halliburton/KBR, $579 million; 
BAE Systems, $400 million),15 also obtained over 
$10 billion dollars in U.S. Government contracts 
in FY 2010.16 These figures demonstrate that the 
FCPA creates a substantial risk for U.S. Govern-
ment contractors that want to maintain or grow 
their business with certain foreign governments. 
If a U.S. Government contractor runs afoul of 
the FCPA, it could be subject to a multitude 
of penalties beyond those faced by companies 
that do not contract with the U.S. Government, 
as discussed below. Indeed, U.S. Government 
contractors that violate the FCPA face not only 
sky-high fines and other monetary penalties, but 
also risk being blacklisted and prevented from 
bidding on future contracting opportunities of-
fered by its Government customers.17
FCPA Basics & Recent Developments In The 
Law
 The FCPA contains two distinct components: 
(1) the antibribery prohibitions18 and (2) the 
recordkeeping and internal control provisions.19 
The DOJ is responsible for all criminal enforce-
ment of the antibribery provisions and all civil 
enforcement of the antibribery provisions involving 
domestic concerns and foreign companies and 
nationals.20 The DOJ is also responsible for the 
criminal enforcement of “willful” violations of the 
books-and-records provisions.21 The U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission is responsible for civil 
enforcement of the books-and-records provisions, 
as well as for civil enforcement of the antibribery 
provisions as applied to “issuers”—any U.S. or 
foreign company, or an officer, employee, agent, 
or stockholder thereof, that either issues securi-
ties (or American Depositary Receipts) or must 
file reports with the SEC.22 The Federal Bureau 
of Investigation now plays a prominent role in 
FCPA matters, including through its specialized 
“International Corruption Unit” dedicated to the 
investigation of overseas corruption.23 Indeed, all 
three agencies have specialized units dedicated 
to the enforcement of the FCPA.24 
 ■ Antibribery Prohibitions
 The antibribery provisions prohibit the offer 
or payment of money or anything of value to a 
foreign official for the purpose of obtaining or 
retaining business.25 The phrase “anything of 
value” has always been construed broadly by the 
Government and is not limited to money.26 Gen-
erally, whether an item constitutes “anything of 
value” depends on the subjective value attached 
by the particular recipient.27 Moreover, there is 
no minimum value that must be met before the 
item constitutes an improper gift. Recent en-
forcement actions indicate that even de minimis 
payments are prohibited under the antibribery 
provisions. For example, the Criminal Informa-
tion charging Panalpina Inc. with conspiring to 
violate and violating the antibribery provisions 
of the FCPA noted that “[t]he value of the bribe 
payments ranged from de minimis amounts to 
$25,000 per transaction,”28 and in the settlement 
of Paradigm B.V.’s FCPA enforcement action, the 
Government noted that the bribes included pay-
ments or “acceptance” fees of $100–200 dollars.29 
 The antibribery provisions prohibit the brib-
ery of foreign government officials—they do not 
prohibit bribery of purely commercial entities. 
The FCPA expressly defines the term “foreign 
official” as officers or employees of a foreign 
government, including its departments, agen-
cies and instrumentalities, public international 
organizations, or persons acting in an official ca-
pacity for or on behalf of these entities.30 Similar 
to other aspects of the FCPA, the Government 
has interpreted the term “foreign official” very 
broadly, including low-level employees of state-
owned entities. Although the FCPA’s definition 
of foreign official does not expressly mention 
state-owned enterprises, the Government has 
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argued that state-owned enterprises are merely 
an “instrumentality” of a foreign government, as 
expressly provided for in the FCPA.31 In several 
recent cases, federal judges have affirmed the 
Government’s interpretation of “foreign official,” 
including a case in May 2011, where a judge 
ruled that a state-owned entity may qualify as 
an “instrumentality” of a foreign government.32 
The defendants in that matter, former executives 
from Control Components Inc., argued that a 
state-owned entity could never be considered an 
instrumentality of a foreign government.33 The 
judge rejected this argument, explaining that 
the determination regarding whether a company 
is an instrumentality is a question of fact that 
depends upon various factors, including (a) the 
foreign state’s characterization of the entity and 
its employees, (b) the foreign state’s degree of 
control over the entity, (c) the purpose of the 
entity’s activities, (d) the entity’s obligations and 
privileges under the foreign state’s law, includ-
ing whether the entity exercises exclusive or 
controlling power to administer its designated 
functions, (e) the circumstances surrounding 
the entity’s creation, and (f) the foreign state’s 
extent of ownership of the entity, including the 
level of financial support by the state (e.g., sub-
sidies, special tax treatment, and loans).34 The 
court stated that the factors are “not exclusive, 
and no single factor is dispositive,” explaining 
that they are merely “relevant when determining 
whether a state-owned company constitutes an 
‘instrumentality’ under the FCPA.”35 Other recent 
cases have also supported the Government’s in-
terpretation,36 indicating that the Government’s 
broad definition of the term “foreign official” 
should be a benchmark for companies designing 
FCPA compliance policies. 
 The FCPA provides one limited exception to 
the antibribery prohibitions, as well as two affir-
mative defenses. All three are difficult to navigate 
and rarely provide an adequate safeguard for a 
company once improper payments have been 
detected. The facilitating payment exception 
states that the antibribery prohibitions do not 
apply “to any facilitating payment or expediting 
payment to a foreign official, political party, or 
party official the purpose of which is to expedite 
or to secure the performance of a routine govern-
mental action.”37 This extremely limited exception 
is designed to permit payments used to expedite 
“non-discretionary, ministerial activities performed 
by mid- or low-level foreign functionaries.”38 The 
exception is so limited, it has even been called 
“illusory.”39 For example, in the DOJ’s settlement 
with Noble Corporation for payments it made to 
Nigerian customs officials in “special handling 
charge[s],” the Government stated that the pay-
ments “were not qualifying facilitating payments 
under the FCPA or otherwise legitimate expenses.”40 
Consequently, because the company improperly 
recorded the fees as “facilitation payments” in its 
books and records, the Government also alleged 
that Noble Corporation created false books and 
records in violation of the FCPA. The U.S. Gov-
ernment’s limited interpretation of the facilitat-
ing payment exception brings it in line with the 
majority of other governments, including the 
United Kingdom, that do not permit facilitating 
payments under their antibribery regimes.41 As 
the Noble matter demonstrates, the facilitation 
payment exception has caused confusion among 
companies that do business with foreign govern-
ments, especially given the “continued high level 
of demand for facilitation payments by foreign 
officials, especially customs officers and for the 
implementation of operating and maintenance 
contracts.”42 Despite this increasing demand, 
facilitation payments continue to create a di-
lemma for companies, given that (1) facilitation 
payments are likely prohibited in the country in 
which they are being sought, (2) there is little 
available guidance regarding when the exception 
is applicable, and (3) even if a payment were 
to qualify as a facilitation payment, a company 
would still need to record it properly in its books 
and records. Indeed, failure to accurately record 
potentially qualifying facilitation payments has 
caused numerous companies to run afoul of the 
FCPA’s books-and-records provisions.43 
 The two affirmative defenses to the antibribery 
prohibitions are similarly limited in scope. Both 
provisions provide a defense to liability under 
the antibribery prohibitions for payments or gifts 
to foreign officials if they are (1) lawful under 
the written laws and regulations of the foreign 
official’s country, or (2) “reasonable and bona 
fide” expenditures incurred by or on behalf of a 
foreign official “directly related” to the promo-
tion, demonstration, or explanation of products 
 Briefing Papers © 2011 by Thomson Reuters
★   AUGUST    BRIEFING PAPERS    2011    ★
5
or services or to the execution or performance of 
a contract with a foreign government or agency.44
 The first affirmative defense permits payments 
only if they are expressly authorized under the 
written laws or regulations of the foreign country. 
This defense has long been considered relatively 
obsolete, but was further narrowed in a recent 
court ruling that clarified that this affirmative 
defense applies only to laws that render the bribe 
itself legal, regardless of whether the law provides 
a form of legal amnesty to the defendant under 
certain circumstances.45 
 The second affirmative defense permits U.S. 
companies to pay “reasonable and bona fide” 
expenses associated with a foreign official’s visit 
to the United States, as long as they are directly 
related to the promotion or demonstration of a 
product or to the performance of a Government 
contract.46 The DOJ’s FCPA Opinion Procedure, 
under which the agency responds to specific 
inquiries submitted by companies concerning 
the legality of their conduct under the FCPA,47 
continues to provide instructive guidance regard-
ing this affirmative defense.48 Among many other 
Opinion Procedures released in past years, the 
first for 2011 outlines “hospitality” best practices, 
which include, but are not limited to the following: 
(1) companies should pay only for the expendi-
tures of the government officials, not spouses or 
other family members, (2) the company should 
not play a role in selecting the government official 
who will visit, (3) costs should be paid directly 
to service providers, (4) companies should not 
provide officials with cash or spending money, 
(5) any souvenirs provided should have nominal 
value, and (6) side trips and other nonbusiness-
related activities should not be funded by the 
company.49
 ■ Recordkeeping & Accounting Provisions
 The recordkeeping and accounting provisions 
of the FCPA require issuers of publicly traded 
securities to maintain records and accounts that 
accurately reflect the company’s transactions.50 
The provisions also require an issuer to maintain 
internal accounting controls sufficient to provide 
reasonable assurance that its financial statements are 
accurate.51 The purpose of the latter requirement is 
to ensure a company detects and (preferably) pre-
vents violations of the FCPA. Moreover, because the 
accounting requirements are based on a concept of 
reasonableness and not materiality, the provisions 
apply to all documents and records, regardless of the 
dollar amount involved in the specific transaction.52 
For example, Team Inc., a Texas industrial services 
company, disclosed that it was internally investigat-
ing potential corrupt payments totaling at most, 
$50,000.53 Moreover, in its disclosure, the company 
explained that the total annual revenues from the 
branch of the company involved in the improper 
activity represented “approximately one-half of one 
percent of our annual consolidated revenues.”54 Be-
cause there is no de minimis exception applicable to 
the books-and-records provisions of the FCPA, the 
company found itself spending approximately $3.2 
million to investigate payments that were immaterial 
to the company’s overall financial situation.55 This 
example makes clear that companies must ensure 
their books and records are accurate and must make 
internal controls a priority. 
 The accounting and antibribery sections work 
in tandem to prevent companies from hiding 
bribes and other improper transactions off-the-
record to conceal misconduct.56 There is, however, 
no requirement that the accounting provisions 
must be linked to the bribery of a foreign official. 
Consequently, the Government may prosecute a 
company for violating the accounting provisions, 
even in the absence of a separate violation of the 
antibribery provisions.57 In recent years, the SEC 
has taken action against companies pursuant to 
the accounting provisions of the Act, even when 
the Government is unable to establish a viola-
tion of the antibribery provisions. For example, 
in 2011, the SEC settled a civil action charging 
NATCO Group, Inc. with violations of the books-
and-records and internal control provisions of 
the FCPA.58 In the NATCO action, the Govern-
ment alleged that the company’s wholly owned 
subsidiary, TEST Automation & Controls, Inc., 
“created and accepted false documents while 
paying extorted immigration fines and obtaining 
immigration visas in the Republic of Kazakhstan.” 
Although the company made improper payments, 
it was not charged with violating the antibribery 
provisions.59 Instead, the Government alleged 
that TEST violated the accounting provisions of 
the FCPA when it falsely characterized the pay-
ments as a “salary advance.”60 
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FCPA Jurisdiction
 The FCPA’s prohibitions and requirements 
have been construed broadly by the relevant 
enforcement agencies, especially in regard to 
its jurisdictional reach. The FCPA’s antibribery 
prohibitions apply to any act “in furtherance of” 
an improper payment taken within the United 
States, regardless of the nationality of the party 
engaging in the improper activity.61 Thus, the 
antibribery provisions apply to both U.S. and for-
eign concerns, if the conduct occurs in any area 
over which the United States asserts “territorial 
jurisdiction.”62 Territorial jurisdiction also applies 
to any issuer that has a class of securities (includ-
ing American Depository Receipts) registered 
pursuant to 15 U.S.C.A. § 78l or that is required 
to file reports with the SEC under 15 U.S.C.A. 
§ 78o(d).63 The antibribery provisions’ nationality-
based jurisdiction renders the statute applicable 
to acts taken wholly outside the United States, 
as long as a U.S. concern or issuer commits the 
act.64 Jurisdiction under the accounting provi-
sions of the FCPA extend only to individuals or 
companies that meet the definition of “issuer.”65 
 In recent enforcement actions, the Govern-
ment has continued to expand FCPA jurisdiction, 
especially in regard to foreign companies and 
individuals. Since 1998, the FCPA antibribery 
prohibitions have applied to both “issuer” and 
non-“issuer” foreign companies and individuals 
that commit an act in furtherance of the bribe 
while in the territory of the United States.66 The 
Government’s liberal interpretation of the FCPA’s 
“in furtherance of” requirement has enabled the 
Government to pursue foreign companies and 
individuals, as long as they take some act within 
the United States that facilitates or furthers the 
improper payment.67 Indeed, eight of the eleven 
top FCPA settlements in history involve foreign 
companies (or persons).68 Recent enforcement 
actions have demonstrated that the Government 
will pursue foreign companies even when the act 
“in furtherance of” the improper payment includes 
a mere transfer through a correspondent account 
in the United States. For example, in 2011, JGC 
Corporation resolved FCPA allegations, agreeing to 
a settlement including $218.8 million for the bribery 
of Nigerian government officials.69 The Criminal 
Information included allegations that JGC aided 
and abetted a co-conspirator in causing “corrupt 
U.S. dollar payments” to be wire transferred from 
a bank account in Amsterdam, “via correspondent 
bank accounts in New York,” to bank accounts in 
Switzerland, to be used, in part, for the bribery of 
Nigerian government officials.70 The Government 
has alleged jurisdiction on the basis of the use of 
correspondent accounts in several other recent 
enforcement actions as well, including against 
Siemens,71 KBR,72 and Technip S.A.73
 While most FCPA enforcement actions in recent 
years have continued to push the boundaries of 
the FCPA’s territorial jurisdiction, a recent case 
indicates that there are limits to the reach of 
the FCPA. When the U.S. Government charged 
Pankesh Patel, a UK citizen, with violating the 
FCPA, the Government predicated jurisdiction on 
allegations that Patel mailed an original copy of 
a purchase agreement relating to alleged corrupt 
activity from the United Kingdom to the United 
States.74 The court rejected this argument, granting 
Patel’s Rule 29 acquittal motion, and noting that 
because the mailing of the agreement occurred 
in the United Kingdom, it was not “in the terri-
tory of the United States” and did not establish 
jurisdiction under 15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-3(a).75 
While the Government’s broad interpretations 
of jurisdiction are rarely tested, it is possible that 
as more companies and individuals test these 
theories in court, some limitations to the reach 
of the FCPA may be established. 
FCPA Sanctions
 ■ Monetary Fines & Penalties 
 Recent enforcement actions indicate that a com-
pany’s failure to adequately monitor its business 
practices overseas could cost it hundreds of millions 
of dollars in fines and expenses. The consequences 
are even more problematic for contractors that do 
business with the U.S. Government, as an FCPA 
violation could harm a contractor’s business with 
the U.S. Government and foreign governments. 
Contractors have substantial incentive to comply 
with the FCPA given the potential penalties that 
may result if they fail to do so. 
 The FCPA’s primary sanction for violations of 
its provisions involves monetary fines, penalties, 
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and incarceration. Penalties for corporations and 
other business entities that violate the FCPA’s 
antibribery provisions include a civil penalty of 
up to $10,000 and a criminal fine of up to $2 mil-
lion, while penalties for individuals include a civil 
penalty of up to $10,000, a criminal fine of up to 
$250,000, and five years’ imprisonment, for each 
violation of the FCPA.76 In addition, the “Sentence 
of fine” statute permits the Government to fine 
persons up to twice the gross pecuniary gain or 
loss resulting from the corrupt payment.77 These 
fines and penalties are particularly difficult for 
individuals, because employers are not permitted 
to pay for their employees’ monetary penalties.78
  Violations of the recordkeeping and internal 
control provisions may result in civil penalties of 
up to $500,000 for an entity and up to $100,000 for 
an individual, or the gross amount of pecuniary 
gain.79 Criminal violations of the recordkeeping 
provisions carry a maximum fine of $25 million for 
companies, and a $5 million fine and incarcera-
tion for up to 20 years for individuals.80 The SEC 
also typically seeks disgorgement of any ill-gotten 
gains associated with the improper activity.81 
 Recent FCPA enforcement actions indicate that 
the Government is continuing to use monetary 
penalties, disgorgement, forfeiture, and incarcera-
tion to deter other companies and individuals 
from running afoul of the FCPA. The Govern-
ment will continue to prosecute FCPA actions 
in this manner, because “prosecuting individu-
als—and levying substantial criminal fines against 
corporations—are the best ways to capture the 
attention of the business community.”82 Indeed, 
FCPA enforcement is responsible for nearly 50% 
of the $2 billion in settlements and judgments 
obtained by the Criminal Division of the DOJ in 
2010.83 The SEC has been similarly active. Since 
2010, the SEC has filed 32 FCPA cases and settled 
enforcement actions resulting in more than $600 
million in penalties, disgorgement, and interest.84
 The Government’s message has been clear: if you 
violate the FCPA, you will pay for it. The numbers 
support this. In 2010, the DOJ and SEC imposed 
over $1.7 billion in penalties and disgorgement 
for violations of the FCPA—the highest year for 
FCPA fines in history.85 In the past decade, the 
dollar amounts have increased at a dramatic rate. 
Indeed, the top 10 FCPA corporate settlements of 
all time were imposed between 2008–2011, with 
Siemens AG holding the title of “most expensive 
FCPA violation” to date.86 
 The top 10 corporate settlements total nearly 
$3.2 billion in fines and penalties. Fines against 
individuals are similarly large. Between 1998 and 
October 2010, more than $2 billion in criminal 
fines were imposed against individuals.87 This num-
ber includes several sizable monetary payouts by 
individuals, including the eighth most expensive 
FCPA enforcement action to date against Jeffrey 
Tesler, totaling $148,964,568.88 
 The Government also continues to exploit the 
other monetary remedies available to it, such as 
disgorgement. In fact, from 2004 to date, over $1 
billion has been disgorged.89 Disgorgement is an 
equitable remedy used to prevent an entity from 
profiting from illegal activities by stripping it of 
any ill-gotten gains it may have received as a result 
of the improper activity.90 The SEC currently uses 
disgorgement as an enforcement tool in a majority 
of the FCPA matters it settles. Because disgorge-
ment is not considered punitive, the SEC may 
only disgorge “the approximate amount earned 
from the alleged illicit activities.”91 FCPA-related 
disgorgements can total hundreds of millions of 
dollars, as with Siemens ($350 million),92 KBR 
($177 million),93 and Snamprogetti ($125 mil-
lion).94 
 The Government may also subject FCPA violators 
to another financial blow—forfeiture. “Forfeiture” 
permits the Government to seize a wide variety of 
assets, including money judgments, property, and 
substitute assets.95 The Government will use “sub-
stitute assets” when the proceeds of a defendant’s 
illegal act are unrecoverable as the result of the 
defendant’s acts or omissions.96 Although tradi-
tionally considered to be a rarely used sanction, 
recent FCPA enforcement actions suggest that this 
Company Date of 
Settlement
DOJ SEC Total 
1 Siemens 12/12/08 $450,000,000 $350,000,000 $800,000,000
2 Halliburton/KBR 2/11/09 402,000,000 177,000,000 579,000,000
3 BAE 3/1/10 400,000,000 0 400,000,000
4 Snamprogetti 7/7/10 240,000,000 125,000,000 365,000,000
5 Technip 6/28/10 240,000,000 98,000,000 338,000,000
6 JGC Corporation 4/6/11 218,800,000 0 218,800,000
7 Daimler 4/1/10 93,600,000 91,400,000 185,000,000
8 Alcatel-Lucent 12/27/10 92,000,000 45,372,000 137,372,000
9 Panalpina 11/4/10 70,560,000 11,300,000 81,890,000
10 J&J 4/8/11 21,400,000 48,600,000 70,000,000
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is no longer the case. For example, after paying 
bribes to Nigerian government officials for nearly 
decade to obtain engineering, procurement, and 
construction contracts, Jeffrey Tesler, a former 
consultant to KBR and its joint venture partners, 
pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the FCPA 
and agreed to forfeit $148,964,568—the largest 
FCPA-related forfeiture involving an individual 
in history.97 Similarly, when Gerald and Patricia 
Green, former Hollywood film executives, were 
convicted of nine counts of violating the FCPA 
and seven counts of money laundering for their 
payment of approximately $1.8 million in bribes 
to the former governor of the Tourism Authority 
of Thailand,98 in addition to other sanctions and 
remedies, the court imposed a personal money 
judgment of criminal forfeiture in the amount of 
$1,049,465, plus the amount of each defendant’s 
share of their pension plans.99 The defendants 
could not satisfy this order, so the Government 
filed a motion seeking substitute assets in the form 
of Patricia Green’s West Hollywood residence.100 
The sanctions and forfeiture eventually rendered 
the defendants indigent, claiming the couple’s 
savings, home, car, company, and pension assets.101 
 The Government is also using forfeiture as a 
means to recover illegal bribes from the foreign 
government officials who accept them. Attorney 
General Eric Holder has made clear that through 
the “enforcement of [the United States’] asset 
forfeiture laws,” recovering the bribes accepted 
by foreign officials is “a global imperative.”102 For 
example, in 2010, Robert Antoine, the former 
director of international affairs for Haiti’s state-
owned national telecommunications company, 
Telecommunications D’Haiti, pleaded guilty to 
conspiracy to commit money laundering.103 In 
his plea agreement, Antoine admitted to accept-
ing bribes from three U.S. telecommunications 
companies and laundering them through inter-
mediary companies.104 In addition to a four-year 
prison sentence and the payment of $1,852,209 
in restitution, the U.S. Government was able to 
recover the illegal proceeds of this bribery scheme 
by ordering Antoine to forfeit $1,580,771.105 
 ■ Incarceration
 In addition to monetary penalties and remedies, 
the most dramatic trend in recent FCPA actions 
involves the incarceration of individuals who vio-
late the FCPA. The Government has made clear 
that FCPA violations may result in “very serious 
penalties, which can include substantial prison 
time for individuals who violate the law.”106 The 
prison terms have been significant. In April 2011, 
Charles Paul Edward Jumet, an officer of Ports 
Engineering Consultants Corporation, received 
an 87-month prison sentence—the longest prison 
sentence ever associated with an FCPA matter.107 
Jumet pleaded guilty to conspiring to violate the 
FCPA by conspiring to pay more than $200,000 
in bribes to Panamanian government officials in 
exchange for contracts to maintain lighthouses 
and buoys along Panama’s waterway.108 Jumet also 
made a false statement to federal agents about 
the true nature of a check used to corruptly pay 
a Panamanian government official.109 Similarly, 
the former chairman and chief executive offi-
cer of KBR, Albert “Jack” Stanley, agreed to an 
84-month prison term when he pleaded guilty to 
conspiracy to violate the FCPA and conspiracy to 
commit mail and wire fraud.110 Stanley admitted to 
authorizing a joint venture that paid nearly $200 
million in bribes to Nigerian officials to obtain 
$6 billion in Nigerian construction contracts to 
build liquefied natural gas facilities on Bonny 
Island, Nigeria.111 
 In many cases, judges have ordered prison sen-
tences far lighter than what was initially sought by 
the Government. For example, prosecutors in the 
case against Patricia and Gerald Green sought a 
10-year prison term for both defendants, though 
they each received only six-month terms.112 Leo 
Winston Smith, former director of sales and 
marketing for Pacific Consolidated Industries, 
pleaded guilty to bribing a government official 
in the UK Ministry of Defense.113 Despite the 
Government’s 37-month recommendation, Mr. 
Smith received a six-month prison term with an 
additional six months of home confinement.114 
Prosecutors sought a 168–210 month sentence for 
Nam Nguyen115 for bribing government officials 
in Vietnam to secure high-tech contracts, but 
he was only sentenced to 16 months,116 while his 
co-defendant An Nguyen received nine months 
for his role in the bribery scheme,117 despite the 
87–108 months recommended by prosecutors.118 
While a variety of factors may be the cause of this 
frequent downward departure by judges (e.g., 
 Briefing Papers © 2011 by Thomson Reuters
★   AUGUST    BRIEFING PAPERS    2011    ★
9
health or age of the defendant), judges may be 
revealing a bias against lengthy prison terms for 
cases involving foreign bribery. What is clear, 
however, is that the Government will continue 
to seek lengthy prison terms as both a deterrent 
against corruption and bargaining chip in its 
plea negotiations with individuals. 
FCPA Collateral Consequences
 While the threat of fines, penalties, disgorge-
ment, and incarceration are sufficient to deter 
most companies from bribing officials to obtain 
business with foreign governments, companies 
that contract with the Government have even 
more to lose if they are caught making illicit 
payments. For contractors, their livelihood is 
at risk, because suspension or debarment from 
selling goods or services to the United States 
(and other government entities) is a potential 
collateral consequence of violating the FCPA. 
 ■ U.S. Suspension & Debarment Regime
 The U.S. suspension and debarment regime 
is designed to protect taxpayer dollars by ensur-
ing that the Government does business only 
with responsible firms.119 Both suspension and 
debarment are extraordinary tools, empowering 
the Government with the authority to suspend a 
contractor for up to a year120 or debar a contrac-
tor for up to three years.121 Neither suspension 
nor debarment is meant to be punitive—they are 
designed to ensure that the Government does 
business only with ethical and honest companies. 
A company’s exclusion from the U.S. procure-
ment regime may be as broad or as limited as 
the Government deems necessary to protect its 
interests, ranging from the debarment of the 
entire company to the debarment of a division, 
facility, or even a single individual.122
 While the terms “suspension” and “debarment” 
are often used interchangeably, they differ in 
scope and procedure. The decision to suspend 
or debar hinges on the ability to demonstrate 
“present responsibility,” which requires, among 
other things, a “satisfactory record of integrity 
and business ethics.”123 Suspension is a temporary 
exclusion from contracting, triggered by “adequate 
evidence” of an offense or misconduct that either 
indicates a lack of business integrity or is so seri-
ous that it affects the “present responsibility” of a 
contractor.124 Some agencies consider an indict-
ment of such misconduct, such as the bribery of 
a foreign official, to be adequate evidence of a 
lack of present responsibility (though it is not 
required).125 In contrast, debarment is a more 
permanent status, requiring a “preponderance 
of evidence” of misconduct or the commission of 
an offense that indicates either a lack of business 
integrity or is so serious that it affects the “pres-
ent responsibility” of a contractor.126 An agency 
may debar a contractor based on a conviction 
or civil judgment for various offenses, including 
the bribery of a foreign official, but neither is 
required.127 
 Any agency may suspend or debar a contractor, 
but once an agency has made that determination, 
all agencies must abide by that agency’s decision 
(absent negotiated exceptions). In other words, if 
a contractor is suspended by the U.S. Air Force, 
“it cannot do business with the Navy, [the Na-
tional Aeronautics and Space Administration], 
the [General Services Administration], or any of 
the other approximately 125 Executive Branch 
agencies or departments.”128 Thus, once a company 
is either suspended or debarred, it is completely 
excluded from both obtaining contracts directly 
with the Government and subcontract work under 
prime contracts with the Government.129 Notably, 
because the system is not designed to punish con-
tractors, suspension or debarment only applies 
to future contracts, task orders, and options to 
extend current contracts—neither suspension 
nor debarment affects existing contract work 
with the Government.130
 Once a contractor is either suspended or de-
barred, its status as a blacklisted company is made 
public through a variety of mechanisms. First, 
suspended and debarred contractors are publicly 
listed on the Excluded Party Listing Service.131 
All contracting officials are required to review 
the EPLS prior to award, and prime contractors 
are prohibited from awarding subcontracts to 
contractors on this list as well. The EPLS is even 
often relied upon by state and local governments, 
which often refuse to work with any contractor 
listed on the EPLS. While there are no free, pub-
licly available databases that monitor state and 
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local debarments, there are privately maintained 
databases that are available to the public for a 
fee.132 
 Even if a contractor is neither suspended nor 
debarred, its alleged violation of the FCPA may 
be added to the company’s profile in several 
other databases. The Federal Government now 
maintains a Federal Awardee Performance and 
Integrity Information System (FAPIIS), devel-
oped to maintain “specific information on the 
integrity and performance of covered Federal 
agency contractors and grantees,” such as contract 
terminations, past performance, responsibility 
determinations, administrative agreements, or 
criminal, civil, or administration actions involving 
the contractor. 133 Similar to the EPLS database, 
Contracting Officers are supposed to use FAPIIS 
to review a company’s history, including any past 
misconduct, before awarding a contract.134 In 
addition to the Government-maintained FAPIIS 
database, the Project on Governmental Over-
sight (POGO) maintains a Federal Contractor 
Misconduct Database (FCMD), which contains 
“histories of misconduct such as contract fraud 
and environmental, ethics, and labor violations.”135 
The FCMD “is a compilation of misconduct and 
alleged misconduct committed by the top Fed-
eral Government contractors between January 1, 
1995, and the present,” including civil, criminal, 
or administrative settlements.136 No contractor 
wants to find itself listed in a publicly available 
database alongside companies that have behaved 
in a disreputable manner. These databases may 
not only harm a contractor’s reputation, they can 
also potentially harm a contractor’s Government 
business. Contracting Officers tasked to work with 
only responsible contractors137 may be deterred 
from working with contractors that have blemished 
records. Moreover, because the information in 
these databases is available to the public, media 
and congressional pressure may influence agen-
cies to avoid contracting with FCPA violators. 
 What makes suspension and debarment a par-
ticularly complicated collateral consequence of the 
FCPA, is that it is not a coordinated regime—the 
authority to take such action does not lie with 
the FCPA enforcement agencies—it resides with 
any one of the procuring agencies and binds all 
other agencies to the determination. Moreover, 
any agency can suspend or debar a contractor 
at any time, regardless of the recommendation 
of the DOJ. If a contractor has committed an 
offense, such as bribery, an agency is unlikely 
to find the contractor “presently responsible,” 
unless the contractor can demonstrate that the 
bribery was limited to a division or subsidiary of 
the company that does not do business with the 
U.S. Government. Even then, a contractor must 
still convince the Government that the violation 
of the FCPA was an isolated incident and has no 
bearing on the company’s Government business. 
Consequently, a contractor’s behavior following 
the discovery of the misconduct, its level of coop-
eration with the Government, and any remedial 
measures it has taken, become essential to its 
survival. 
 The risk of suspension and debarment places 
contractors in an unfortunate position when an 
FCPA violation is uncovered. Because the DOJ 
lacks the authority to prevent the suspension 
or debarment of a contractor, contractors must 
proceed cautiously to avoid any of the likely sus-
pension and debarment triggers. If, for example, 
a legal proceeding (such as an indictment) has 
been formally initiated by the DOJ, any procuring 
agency may suspend that contractor until the legal 
proceeding has finished—including any and all 
appeals.138 It is therefore obvious why many U.S. 
contractors try to eliminate this risk as quickly as 
possible through settlement negotiations. 
 Notably, while a company may resolve an FCPA 
matter with the DOJ by settlement agreement 
to avoid a criminal charge or conviction, these 
agreements are not a guaranteed shield against 
suspension or debarment. The Government 
has been clear that neither type of settlement 
agreement will preclude a company’s suspen-
sion or debarment, as the agreements bind 
only the DOJ.139 It is, however, possible for the 
DOJ to agree to make “representations about a 
company’s criminal conduct and remediation 
measures to a government contracting agency” 
to help the company avoid suspension and debar-
ment.140 Thus, it is common for the Government 
to use the threat of suspension and debarment 
to extract extraordinary fines and penalties from 
companies in exchange for their support dur-
ing negotiations with debarment officials from 
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other agencies. Indeed, if a company agrees to 
cooperate, the DOJ may even agree to insert an 
affirmative statement in the settlement documents 
attesting to a company’s present responsibility. 
For example, in 2010, Daimler AG resolved brib-
ery allegations in which the Government alleged 
that the company “engaged in a long-standing 
practice of paying bribes to foreign officials…in at 
least 22 countries…to assist in securing contracts 
with government customers for the purchase of 
Daimler vehicles valued at hundreds of millions 
of dollars.”141 In its deferred prosecution agree-
ment with the DOJ, the Government included a 
provision that stated:142 
With respect to Daimler’s present reliability and 
responsibility as a government contractor, the 
Department agrees to cooperate with Daimler, in 
a form and manner to be agreed, in bringing facts 
relating to the nature of the conduct underlying 
this Agreement and to Daimler’s cooperation and 
remediation to the attention of governmental and 
other debarment authorities. 
 The DOJ’s ability to work with a company to 
avoid suspension and debarment is significant 
leverage given the potentially devastating con-
sequences that either could have on a company. 
Many companies would rather cooperate with 
the DOJ than suffer the consequences that might 
stem from an indictment or guilty verdict. As 
such, it is no surprise that nearly all companies 
settle FCPA charges with the Government rather 
than challenge them in court. 
 In recent years, criticism has been levied against 
the Government for its failure to use the suspen-
sion and debarment tools when companies settle 
FCPA or FCPA-related matters.143 Specifically, com-
mentators and lawmakers have complained that 
when U.S. Government contractors are involved 
in an FCPA enforcement matter, “an agreement 
by DOJ to intervene on the company’s behalf in 
any collateral proceedings, such as suspension and 
debarment, is a staple of deferred prosecution 
agreements.”144 While the indignation is currently 
directed towards the suspension and debarment 
regime in the context of the FCPA, the regime itself, 
even in matters unrelated to the FCPA, has long 
been criticized as an impotent enforcement tool.145 
It is not surprising that this tool is underutilized, 
as the Government depends on a relatively small 
number of contractors to supply a majority of its 
goods and services. Indeed, “with fewer major, 
critical contractors available to compete for the 
Government’s most sophisticated requirements, it 
seems disingenuous to bar a key player from future 
competition.”146 In fact, although BAE Systems 
PLC admitted to (1) conspiring to defraud the 
United States by impairing and impeding its law-
ful functions, (2) making false statements about 
its FCPA compliance program, and (3) violating 
the Arms Export Control Act and International 
Traffic in Arms Regulations when it actually (al-
legedly) bribed government officials in exchange 
for billions of dollars worth of defense contracts, 
the U.S. Government still awarded it over $6.6 
billion in contracts in FY 2010.147 Critics may 
continue to gripe about the current state of the 
suspension and debarment regime, but the take-
away is clear: companies that provide unique and 
important goods and services to the Government 
are highly unlikely to be suspended or debarred 
as the result of an FCPA violation. As such, the 
critics’ demands are not only impractical; they 
demonstrate a fundamental misunderstanding of 
the U.S. suspension and debarment regime. The 
decision to suspend or debar is a business decision 
“that requires a weighing of the risks and benefits 
to the Government of contracting with an ethically 
questionable firm.”148 The Government, therefore, 
has determined in recent matters that the benefits 
to working with contractors that have violated the 
FCPA outweigh the risks. Moreover, requiring 
the mandatory debarment of companies that are 
found to have violated the FCPA could substantially 
deter companies from disclosing wrongdoing, 
remedying problems, and improving compliance 
systems. 149 Indeed, “linking mandatory debarment 
to a criminal resolution would fundamentally alter 
the incentives of a contractor-company to reach 
an FCPA resolution because such a resolution 
would likely lead to the cessation of revenues for 
a government contractor— a virtual death knell 
for the contractor-company.” Similarly, manda-
tory debarment would have a negative impact on 
prosecutorial discretion—eliminating the flexibility 
necessary to fashion an appropriate resolution 
depending on the particular matter.150
 ■ Denial Of Other U.S. Public Advantages
 In addition to debarment from the U.S. pro-
curement regime, a company that violates the 
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FCPA may be ineligible to receive certain other 
“public advantages” from the Government, such 
as grants, loans, subsidies, or insurance.151 Like-
wise, a contractor may be excluded from various 
other Government programs, such as those found 
in agencies like the Commodity Futures Trading 
Commission and the Overseas Private Investment 
Corporation.152 Similarly, the Export-Import Bank 
may also decline, among other things, applica-
tions for export credit as the result of a company’s 
fraudulent or corrupt activity.153  Another poten-
tial collateral consequence of an FCPA violation 
is the possible loss of Government licenses. This 
sanction could have an even more devastating 
impact on a contractor than debarment, as the 
denial of necessary licenses would likely affect 
not only a company’s Government sales, but its 
commercial sector business as well.154 In addition, 
a company could have its Government security 
or facility clearances155 revoked as the result of 
its violation of the FCPA—a sanction that could 
render the company ineligible for any current or 
future contracts containing such requirements. 
 The denial of arms export licenses under § 38 
of the AECA156 is another possible outcome when 
an applicant has been indicted for or convicted 
of violating the FCPA.157 In addition, § 120.1 of 
the ITAR expressly states that licenses or other 
approvals may not be granted to entities indicted 
for, or convicted of, violating the FCPA.158 Follow-
ing BAE’s $400 million FCPA-related settlement 
with the DOJ, the U.S. Department of State an-
nounced that it entered into a civil settlement 
with BAE Systems for 2,591 alleged violations 
of the AECA and ITAR “in connection with the 
unauthorized brokering of U.S. defense articles 
and services, failure to register as a broker, failure 
to file annual broker reports, causing unauthor-
ized brokering, failure to report the payment 
of fees or commissions associated with defense 
transactions, and the failure to maintain records 
involving ITAR-controlled transactions.”159 The 
settlement required BAE to pay $79 million in 
fines and remedial compliance measures—the 
largest civil penalty in State Department history.160 
Because of BAE’s criminal conviction, the State 
Department imposed a statutory debarment on 
BAE, but concurrently rescinded the order, after 
determining that “appropriate steps had been 
taken to mitigate law enforcement concerns.”161 
The Department also released an administrative 
hold that it had placed on BAE’s license authoriza-
tion requests immediately following the company’s 
conviction. The agency did, however, impose a 
“policy of denial” on three BAE subsidiaries that 
were substantially involved in the activities that 
led to the company’s conviction. This means that 
there is “an initial presumption of denial” for all 
applications from the impacted entities absent a 
determination by the State Department that “it is 
in the foreign policy or national security interests 
of the United States to provide an approval.”162 
Global Antibribery Enforcement &  
Collateral Consequences
 Government contractors with a global pres-
ence must not only worry about compliance 
with the FCPA, they also must be aware of the 
antibribery laws in other countries as well. In 
recent years, numerous other countries have 
implemented more aggressive antibribery regimes 
and are actively investigating and prosecuting 
bribery cases. For example, the UK Bribery 
Act, in force since July 1, 2011, is currently the 
cause of greatest concern to companies that do 
business in the United Kingdom, because its 
provisions are broad, relatively undefined, and 
prohibit activities beyond those prohibited by 
the FCPA. Similar to the FCPA, the UK Bribery 
Act prohibits the bribery of foreign officials, 
but it also prohibits commercial bribery and 
the failure of a commercial organization to 
prevent bribery.163 Also unlike the FCPA, the 
Bribery Act extends jurisdiction over bribe 
recipients.164 The UK Bribery Act is causing 
further difficulty for companies that do business 
in both the United States and United Kingdom 
because it does not permit facilitation payments 
or allow an affirmative defense for hospitality 
expenditures. As such, companies are strongly 
advised to review and update their bribery poli-
cies and compliance programs to ensure they 
comply not only with the FCPA, but with the 
new heightened standards provided by the UK 
Bribery Act (and the bribery laws in any other 
country in which the company does business).
 In addition to the penalties associated with 
the violation of a foreign country’s antibribery 
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laws, contractors may also be debarred from 
doing business with a foreign government. If a 
company violates the FCPA (or another coun-
try’s antibribery laws), debarment from govern-
ment procurement contracts in Europe is also 
a potential consequence. Article 45 of the EU 
Public Sector Procurement Directive requires 
contractors convicted of any of the following 
crimes to be debarred from public procurement: 
(1) participation in a criminal organization, 
(2) corruption, (3) fraud, or (4) money laun-
dering.165 This is a punitive regime under which 
debarment is mandatory and is designed to deter 
corruption and bribery in public procurement 
activities.166 The mandatory debarment trigger is 
clear: “conviction by final judgment of which the 
contracting authority is aware.”167 This stringent 
penalty provides an even greater incentive for 
companies that violate antibribery laws to settle 
with the Government—they do not want to lose 
their contracts with the EU member states. While 
there is an exception for “overriding requirements 
in the general interest,” it is unclear whether 
authorities would permit an exception to the 
mandatory debarment rules for a company that 
violates the FCPA or other antibribery laws.168 In 
addition, even if a contractor is not “convicted” 
of violating such a law, it may still be prohibited 
from contracting with an EU member state. Sec-
tion 2 of Article 45 also describes a discretionary 
debarment trigger under which contractors may 
be excluded for a variety of other reasons, includ-
ing “grave professional misconduct.”169 
 The mandatory debarment provisions have been 
implemented in the United Kingdom through 
Regulation 23(1) of the Public Contracts Regula-
tions 2006170 and Regulation 26(1) of the Utili-
ties Contracts Regulations 2006.171 Moreover, in 
June 2011, the UK Ministry of Justice published 
amended legislation relating to the Bribery Act 
making clear that mandatory debarment will be 
a likely collateral consequence of a conviction 
under §§ 1 and 6 of the Bribery Act—the bribery 
of another person or a foreign public official, 
respectively.172 Conversely, the MOJ has stated 
publicly that a corporation’s conviction under 
§ 7 of the Bribery Act—failure of a commercial 
organization to prevent bribery—may only result 
in discretionary debarment.173 
 Recent FCPA-related settlements have dem-
onstrated that government officials in both 
the United States and Europe may go to great 
lengths to prevent a valuable contractor from 
being excluded by the EU mandatory debarment 
provisions, as “there is a growing recognition that 
the [European Union] debarment requirement 
presents particular challenges for companies 
trying to settle cases.”174 As a result, the Govern-
ment considers “collateral consequences when 
structuring settlement agreements.” 175 The Gov-
ernment’s settlement with BAE exemplifies this 
issue. Despite widespread allegations of bribery, 
neither the U.S. nor UK governments charged BAE 
with violating the countries’ relevant antibribery 
laws. Thus, neither settlement agreement trig-
gered mandatory debarment—a clear goal of the 
two countries, given that debarment could “ruin 
BAE, which employs more than 100,000 people 
and is the biggest supplier to the British Armed 
Forces.”176 In this instance, the U.S. Government 
extracted an extraordinary $400 million criminal 
fine from BAE, the third highest FCPA settlement 
in history, in exchange for lesser charges that 
would not implicate the mandatory debarment 
regime. Indeed, the BAE Sentencing Memoran-
dum expressly explains that the settlement was 
structured for this reason, noting that:177
 Mandatory exclusion under EU debarment 
regulations is unlikely in light of the nature of the 
charge to which BAES is pleading. Discretionary 
debarment will presumably be considered and 
determined by various suspension and debarment 
officials.
 The Department will communicate with 
U.S. debarment and regulatory authorities, and 
relevant foreign authorities, if requested to do 
so, regarding the nature of the offense of which 
BAES has been convicted, the conduct engaged 
in by BAES, its remediation efforts, and the facts 
relevant to an assessment of whether BAES is 
presently a responsible Government contractor.
Recent settlements with Siemens AG and Daimler 
AG were similarly structured to avoid implicating 
the mandatory debarment regime.178 
Debarment By Other International  
Organizations
 Other international organizations may also 
suspend or debar contractors if the company or 
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individual is found to have violated the FCPA. For 
example, the World Bank may debar any firms or 
entities that have been found “to have engaged 
in fraudulent, corrupt, collusive, coercive or ob-
structive practices.”179 In fact, “debarment with 
conditional release has become the default or 
‘baseline’” sanction for such actions.180 Similar to 
the United States, the World Bank also maintains 
a list of debarred contractors that renders the 
companies and individuals on the list “ineligible 
to be awarded a World Bank-financed contract” 
for the period of debarment.181 
 Historically, the World Bank has demonstrated 
that it is far more likely than its government coun-
terparts to debar a company in response to corrupt 
behavior. For example, the World Bank exercised its 
debarment authority against Siemens after Siemens 
settled its FCPA violations with the United States.182 
Specifically, Siemens AG and its affiliates entered 
into a settlement agreement with the “World Bank 
Group,”183 under which it agreed to, among other 
things, debarment from all projects, programs, or 
other investments financed or guaranteed by the 
World Bank for at least two years and a payment 
of $100 million over 15 years to support global ef-
forts to fight fraud and corruption.184 In a separate 
proceeding, the World Bank debarred Siemens 
Russia OOO, a subsidiary of Siemens AG, for four 
years for “having engaged in fraudulent and cor-
rupt practices in relation to a World Bank-financed 
project”185 The World Bank Group permitted Sie-
mens to continue working on existing contracts, 
though it required the company to withdraw all 
bids that had not been accepted by the start of the 
debarment period.186 Similarly, the World Bank 
debarred Macmillan, a UK-based publisher, after 
it admitted to bribing officials in Sudan to win a 
World Bank-related contract to print educational 
material.187 The debarment has rendered Macmil-
lan ineligible from Bank-financed contracts for six 
years.188
 Debarment from a multilateral bank is now 
even a greater risk to companies that have vio-
lated the FCPA given a recent action taken by 
the heads of leading multilateral development 
banks to purge corrupt companies and individuals 
from their projects. On April 9, 2010, the leading 
MDBs—the African Development Bank, the Asian 
Development Bank, the European Bank for Recon-
struction and Development, the Inter-American 
Development Bank Group, and the World Bank 
Group—entered into an “Agreement For Mutual 
Enforcement of Debarment Decisions,” under 
which a company or individual debarred by one 
bank may be debarred from contracting with all 
five development banks, as long as the debar-
ment exceeds a period of one year and relates 
to corruption.189 This agreement is made even 
more effective by its disclosure requirements: all 
five institutions are required to notify each other 
when they have debarred a contractor.190
 In addition to MDBs, other institutions may refuse 
to do business with a company that violates the FCPA. 
For example, a company may be suspended from 
doing business with the United Nations Secretariat 
Procurement Division if it violates the FCPA.191 A 
year after Siemens settled its FCPA violations with 
the U.S. Government, Siemens announced that 
the Vendor Review Committee of the UNPD was 
suspending Siemens from the UNPD vendor data-
base for a minimum period of six months.192 
Other Costs Associated With FCPA  
Enforcement
 While the Government has a mighty arsenal of 
penalties and sanctions that it can impose on com-
panies that run afoul of the FCPA, they are not the 
only costs a company could face should it uncover 
evidence of questionable payments. For example, 
an internal investigation could cost a company mil-
lions of dollars. In 2009, Team Inc. disclosed that 
an internal investigation uncovered questionable 
payments totaling no more than $50,000.193 In a 
filing with the SEC, the company noted that it had 
spent approximately $3.2 million in investigation-
related expenses, such as legal fees.194 The SEC 
notified Team in 2011 that it did not intend to 
impose fines or penalties on the company.195 The 
DOJ similarly indicated that it was unlikely to take 
formal action against the company, though it has yet 
to formally close the investigation.196 The company, 
therefore, spent $3.2 million—an amount 64 times 
greater than the $50,000 the company allegedly 
paid to obtain an improper business advantage, to 
investigate allegations that the Government did not 
deem worthy of prosecution. This example makes 
clear that for many companies, the costs associated 
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with a discovered FCPA violation may far exceed 
any benefit obtained by the bribe. 
 Similarly, when Avon Products Inc. received 
notice of an allegation that “certain travel, 
entertainment and other expenses may have 
been improperly incurred in connection with 
the Company’s China operations,” it launched 
an internal investigation that, according to the 
company’s own disclosures, has cost them over 
$150 million dollars to date.197 While the initial 
allegation involved only the company’s activities 
in China, the investigation soon expanded to the 
company’s operations in other countries.198 Thus, 
it is possible that by the time Avon finishes its 
investigation and begins settlement negotiations 
with the Government, the cost of the internal 
investigation alone will top $250 million.199 
 Other collateral expenses may result from the 
disclosure of an FCPA investigation in an SEC 
filing. In particular, this type of disclosure may 
result in a substantial decrease in the company’s 
stock price, profits, or sales, generating yet 
another FCPA-related cost. For example, when 
Avon disclosed its investigation into bribery al-
legations in China, its shares dropped 8%.200 
When Faro Technologies Inc. disclosed that it 
was close to settling an FCPA enforcement action 
with the DOJ and SEC, the company directly at-
tributed a drop in profits to its announcement 
regarding the pending FCPA settlement.201 When 
weapons maker Smith & Wesson announced an 
internal investigation into potential violations 
of the FCPA, the company soon discovered that 
the announcement negatively affected its sales, 
disclosing that “[p]istol sales decreased 25.3%, 
driven by the reduction in consumer demand as 
well as reduced international shipments related 
to our investigation of the FCPA matter.”202 
 Companies may also face additional expendi-
tures stemming from collateral civil litigation. 
While there is no private right of action under 
the FCPA,203 companies are now finding that after 
they announce an investigation into allegations 
of improper conduct, or even after they settle 
their FCPA-related enforcement actions, they 
may become the target of lawsuits, including 
but not limited to, securities fraud actions and 
shareholder derivative suits. While the success of 
these suits has varied, some collateral litigation 
has resulted in enormous payouts to the plain-
tiffs: Willbros Group settled for $10.5 million, 
Nature’s Sunshine settled for $6 million, and Faro 
Technologies settled for $6.9 million.204 Avon is 
also currently the target of a number of securities 
fraud and shareholder derivative actions alleg-
ing “breaches of various fiduciary duties for not 
properly monitoring the company’s operations 
and securities violations for not making proper 
disclosure of the problems.”205 Whether these suits 
will be successful remains to be seen, but Avon 
stands as a cautionary tale to other companies 
that do business overseas. One can only assume 
that by the time the dust settles, Avon’s total bill 
for all FCPA-related activity will be astronomical.
The Road To Settlement
 Any contractor that discovers evidence of a 
potential violation of the FCPA must be prepared 
to take immediate action to avoid, or at least 
minimize, the fines, penalties, and collateral 
consequences that may result. Should a company 
become aware of a potential violation of the 
FCPA, its first course of action should be a swift 
and thorough investigation into the allegation. 
Companies should not prolong an investigation, 
as they must demonstrate that they take their 
employees’ claims seriously. Indeed, companies 
that ignore allegations may run the risk that an 
employee will disclose the alleged violation to 
the Government through, among other avail-
able mechanisms, the SEC’s new whistleblower 
program, under which a whistleblower who 
voluntarily provides original information about 
a potential FCPA violation to the SEC that leads 
to the successful enforcement of an administra-
tive action could potentially receive a reward of 
between 10%–30% of a monetary sanction levied 
against the company in excess of $1 million.206 
This new regime highlights the importance of 
adopting company policies designed to effectively 
manage internal complaints and allegations. Spe-
cifically, an effective policy must make clear that 
employee complaints will be taken seriously, kept 
confidential, and will not result in retaliation.207 
 Although in-house counsel may initially verify 
that an allegation has some factual basis, a 
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company’s best course of action is to hire expe-
rienced and independent outside FCPA counsel 
to thoroughly investigate the allegations. The 
outside counsel’s independence is imperative, 
as a company never knows where the trail may 
lead, or who in the company may be implicated 
by the allegations. Moreover, federal enforce-
ment authorities view investigations completed 
by in-house counsel skeptically, often consid-
ering them to be unreliable—especially if the 
results are favorable to company management 
or counsel.208 A company seeking to make a 
good first impression with the SEC and the 
DOJ can avoid these issues by simply retaining 
independent counsel from the outset—or risk 
the Government launching its own investiga-
tion into the allegations.  
 Should a company’s internal investigation un-
cover a potential violation of the FCPA, it must 
decide whether it will disclose the results of the 
internal investigation to Government authori-
ties. While companies are not required by law 
to voluntarily disclose potential FCPA violations, 
they usually do so based on legal, financial, and 
reputational considerations. Moreover, with the 
threat of the new SEC whistleblower program, 
companies may find that disclosure is the only 
appropriate course of action in certain instances. 
 Self-reporting potential FCPA violations is a 
common course of action for companies. In fact, 
the DOJ estimates that roughly 50% of its current 
FCPA investigations derive from voluntary disclo-
sures.209 Companies that do disclose allegations 
must be aware that cooperation does not cease at 
disclosure. Rather, companies must be prepared to 
cooperate fully with the Government throughout 
the entire enforcement process, including the ini-
tial disclosure, a potentially lengthy investigation 
phase, and settlement negotiations. The Govern-
ment has long urged companies to self-report, 
claiming that a company will receive credit for its 
disclosure and cooperation. While in the past, it 
was often difficult to determine whether compa-
nies had, in fact, benefited from disclosure, recent 
FCPA settlements support the Government’s claim. 
For example, the recent settlement of Johnson & 
Johnson’s FCPA enforcement action is an example 
of how the Government may reward cooperation. 
Although Johnson & Johnson admitted to bribing 
“publicly-employed health care providers in Greece, 
Poland and Romania,” and paying kickbacks “to 
the former government of Iraq under the United 
Nations Oil for Food program,” the Government 
praised the company for its cooperation and for 
playing an “important role in identifying improper 
practices in the life sciences industry.”210 The DOJ’s 
press release further describes how it credited the 
company for its disclosure and cooperation, explain-
ing that because of the company’s voluntary disclo-
sure, and extensive cooperation, self investigation, 
remedial efforts, and compliance improvements, 
the company received a reduced fine and was not 
required to retain a corporate monitor.211 
 Most FCPA allegations that have been inves-
tigated by the Government have resulted in a 
form of settlement, including nonprosecution 
agreements, deferred prosecution agreements, 
a consent decree, or a combination of one or 
more of these types of agreements. Nonprosecu-
tion agreements “typically are not filed with the 
court, but instead are maintained by DOJ and the 
corporation,” while deferred prosecution agree-
ments are “typically filed with the court, along 
with a document that identifies the charges that 
the prosecution has brought against the corpora-
tion.212 Nonprosecution agreements and deferred 
prosecution agreements both typically provide a 
detailed account of companies’ alleged wrongdo-
ing and require companies “to comply with a set 
of terms for a specified duration in exchange for 
prosecutors deferring the decision to prosecute or 
deciding not to prosecute.”213 Terms may require 
a company to improve its compliance program, 
hire an independent compliance monitor, or 
make monetary payments ranging from fines 
and penalties to forfeiture and restitution.”214 
The agreements also typically reserve the right 
to take action against a company at a later date 
should the company fail to follow through with 
its compliance obligations or if further violations 
are discovered.215 
 While the Government will often require a com-
pany to retain an independent compliance monitor 
as a condition of settling an enforcement action, 
recent settlement agreements suggest that this 
practice may be on the decline. The Government 
has received substantial criticism in recent years 
about the costs of retaining a corporate monitor, 
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as Judge Ellen Segal Huvelle recently noted dur-
ing a hearing to approve a company’s guilty plea: 
“It’s an outrage, that people get $50 million to be a 
monitor…. It’s a boondoggle.”216 Indeed, a recent 
Government Accountability Office report noted 
some monitors’ rates range from $290 per hour 
to $895 per hour, with the total cost per month 
ranging from $8,000 to $2.1 million .217 
 Perhaps responding to criticism about the excessive 
costs associated with monitors, recent FCPA settle-
ments have required compliance monitors in fewer 
matters, signaling a move towards simply requiring 
companies to self-police and report directly to the 
Government.218 A review of recent FCPA enforce-
ment actions reveals that only one of the seven 
FCPA settlements announced by the DOJ between 
January and mid-July of 2011 involved the appoint-
ment of an independent compliance consultant.219 
The Johnson & Johnson FCPA settlement is instruc-
tive, as the DOJ press release describes several of 
the factors that the Government considered when 
deciding not to impose a compliance monitor: 
(1) the company had a preexisting compliance 
and ethics programs, (2) the company engaged 
in the extensive remediation and improvement of 
its compliance systems and internal controls, and 
(3) the company agreed to enhanced compliance 
undertakings.220 In lieu of a corporate monitor, the 
agreement requires the company to report directly 
to the DOJ regarding the “implementation of its 
remediation and enhanced compliance efforts every 
six months for the duration of the agreement.”221 
Whether the recent shift away from compliance 
monitors is an actual trend that will be present in 
future settlements remains to be seen. 
 While companies and the Government often 
prefer negotiated settlements, whether the settle-
ment actually provides tangible benefit to a con-
tractor often depends not only on the company’s 
cooperation, but the compliance programs in 
place at the time of settlement.222 The ability to 
demonstrate an effective compliance program 
is particularly important for U.S. Government 
contractors, which will be required to demon-
strate “present responsibility” if they wish to avoid 
suspension and debarment. Moreover, even if a 
company has a written FCPA compliance policy 
in place, it must be more than a “paper program” 
that exists without the proper internal controls to 
enforce it. As the Siemens matter demonstrated, 
having a written FCPA policy is worthless if the 
company fails to dedicate proper resources to 
its compliance program, routinely ignores FCPA 
“red flags,” and fails to punish wrongdoers.223 
 Although FCPA enforcement has been widely 
criticized for its lack of judicial review and frequent 
use of settlement agreements to resolve potential 
FCPA violations, the Government’s use of these 
negotiated agreements continues to grow each 
year. In fact, while the SEC has traditionally settled 
alleged violations of the FCPA with cease-and-desist 
orders, in 2010, the SEC announced that it would 
begin using cooperation agreements, such as non-
prosecution agreements and deferred prosecution 
agreements, in its resolution of alleged violations 
of the FCPA.224 The SEC entered into its first de-
ferred prosecution agreement with Tenaris S.A. in 
May 2011.225 The deferred prosecution agreement 
alleges that Tenaris bribed government officials 
in Uzbekistan in exchange for contracts that re-
sulted in a $5 million profit for the company.226 In 
resolving the matter with the Government, Tenaris 
agreed to pay $5.4 million in disgorgement and 
prejudgment interest under its deferred prosecution 
agreement with the SEC, and another $3.5 million 
in criminal penalties under its nonprosecution 
agreement with the DOJ. The SEC explained that 
Tenaris was a proper candidate for the SEC’s first 
deferred prosecution agreement because of the 
company’s “immediate self-reporting, thorough 
internal investigation, full cooperation with SEC 
staff, enhanced anti-corruption procedures, and 
enhanced training.”227 
    These Guidelines are intended to provide guid-
ance regarding FCPA compliance and enforce-
ment issues. They are not, however, a substitute 
for professional representation in any specific 
situation.
 1. Companies should know that the Gov-
ernment interprets the FCPA’s provisions very 
broadly, including the definition of “foreign 
official.” Companies should be aware that low-
level employees of state-owned companies may 
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be considered foreign officials for purposes of 
the FCPA. 
 2. Companies should be aware that the FCPA 
prohibits corrupt payments, regardless of their 
size. There is no exemption for de minimis pay-
ments under the FCPA.
 3. Companies are advised to prohibit employ-
ees from making facilitating payments without 
obtaining advanced, written approval from legal 
counsel. 
 4. Companies should be aware that the Gov-
ernment may charge a company with violating the 
books-and-records provisions of the FCPA, even in 
the absence of a substantive antibribery charge. 
If company legal counsel permits an employee to 
make a facilitating payment, the company must 
ensure that it is properly recorded in the company 
books and records as a “facilitating payment.”
 5. Companies should not pay for any “hos-
pitality expenses” of a foreign official without 
the advanced, written approval of legal counsel. 
Expenses must have a legitimate business pur-
pose and be directly related to the promotion or 
demonstration of a product or the performance 
of a Government contract.
 6. Government contractors should be aware 
that a violation of the FCPA may result in the 
company’s suspension or debarment from the 
U.S. procurement system and, depending on the 
extent of a contractor’s global presence, debar-
ment under the EU regime as well. Contractors 
are advised to negotiate coordinated settlement 
agreements amongst all relevant agencies and 
countries to prevent this collateral consequence. 
 7. Contractors should be familiar with the 
antibribery laws of all of the countries in which 
they do business and must tailor their antibrib-
ery compliance programs to comply with these 
laws. 
 8. If a company discovers evidence of a po-
tential violation of the FCPA, it must take action 
immediately to verify the accuracy of the allega-
tion. Companies should not prolong investiga-
tions, as employee-whistleblowers may disclose 
allegations to the Government. 
 9. Any internal investigation into potential 
FCPA violations should be conducted by experi-
enced and independent outside counsel. Compa-
nies should not leave the internal investigation to 
in-house counsel, who may lack the impartiality 
necessary to fully investigate the company. 
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